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Offer of judgment laws are designed to alleviate some of the most
difficult problems currently facing American courts - enormous legal
expenses, crowded court dockets, and protracted litigation.' These
laws impose a sanction against a party who refuses to accept a timely
offer of settlement that is more favorable than the ultimate recovery.
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The purpose of offer of judgment laws is to encourage settlement and
eliminate trials whenever possible.2 Theoretically, the expense and
3
delay associated with litigation are thereby significantly reduced.
Both the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature have
enacted offer of judgment provisions. The Florida Supreme Court's
provision is Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 1.442. 4 The legislature has promulgated two statutes, Florida Statutes sections 45.061and 768.79.6 Although all three of the provisions are designed to encourage settlement, 7 they differ in their procedural approaches to
achieving this goal. s Predictably, the simultaneous existence of three
offer of judgment provisions with varying procedural details has caused
widespread confusion. 9
In part I, this note addresses the history of the Florida offer of
judgment provisions and the confusion flowing from the enactment of
three separate provisions. Part I also discusses the inadequacy of

2. See Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. 1990); Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply
Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1987).
3. But see Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1985) (presenting
reasons why many attorneys believe that rule 68 has failed to encourage settlement); Varon,
PromotingSettlements and Limiting Litigation Costs by Means of the Offer of Judgment: Some
Suggestions For Using and Revising Rule 68, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 813, 815 (1984) (claiming that
attorneys rarely use rule 68 because the language of the rule is ambiguous and courts "are
unable to reconcile the rule's purposes with other basic legal principles"). See generally Rowe
& Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 30 (1988) (indicating that offer of settlement rules could result in "more
and earlier settlements," but that more research is required to reach definite conclusions about
the net impact on settlement rates).
4. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.442.

5.

FLA. STAT.

§ 45.061 (1989).

6. Id. § 768.79.
7. Aspen, 564 So. 2d at 1083.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1989); id. § 768.79; FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.442; see also Berman
& Cole, The New Offer of Judgment Rule in Florida: What Does One Do Now?, FLA. B.J. 38
(Jan. 1990) (describing procedural differences among the three Florida offer of judgment provisions); Ferrante, The Offer of Judgment Dilemma: A Defense Perspective, 7 TRIAL ADVOC.
Q. 46, 47-50 (1988) (detailing procedural variations among the three Florida offer of judgment
laws); Vocelle, Offers of Judgment, Demands for Judgment, and Offers of Settlement: Who's
on First?, FLA. B.J. 10, 10-14 (Mar. 1988) (describing procedural variations among the three
Florida offer of judgment provisions).
9. See Berman & Cole, supra note 8, at 38-39 (describing the confusion created by the
existence of three offer of judgment laws with differing procedures); Ferrante, supra note 8,
at 50-51 (explaining problems caused by the varying procedures under the offer of judgment
statutes and rule from the perspective of the defense bar); Vocelle, supra note 8, at 14 (finding
that the varying procedures under the offer of judgment statutes and rule can be a trap for
the unwary).
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recent attempts by the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature to resolve the confusion. In part II, this note explains why the
legislative offer of judgment statutes are unconstitutional invasions of
the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive power to promulgate rules
governing practice and procedure. Finally, in part III, this note presents practical reasons, beyond unconstitutionality, for denying the
legislature authority to enact offer of judgment provisions.
I.

ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT CONFUSION IN FLORIDA OFFER OF
JUDGMENT PRACTICE

A.

History of the FloridaOffer of Judgment Provisions

Offer of judgment laws have their theoretical roots in the English
practice of "payment into court." 10 The -federal offer of judgment provision, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 68 was enacted in 1938.11
The framers of rule 68 based the rule on offer of judgment laws already
existing in a number of states. Rule 68 enjoys the distinction of being
the only federal rule devoted exclusively to encouraging settlement. Is
The Florida Supreme Court adopted rule 1.442, Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, in 1972.' In its original form, rule 1.442 was identical
to rule 68.15 The original version required the plaintiff to pay the
defendant's litigation costs if the court awarded the plaintiff a final
judgment which was less than a prejudgment offer made by the defendant pursuant to rule 1.442.'1 Attorney's fees were not included in
the penalty imposed, and only defendants could benefit from the rule.17

*

10. Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees: Comparing English Payment into
Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 301, 303 (1986). Under the payment into court
system, the defendant pays to the proper officer of the court as much as the defendant acknowledges is owed to the plaintiff together with costs. Id. at 307. If the plaintiff chooses to go on
with the litigation and fails to prove that more is due than the defendant paid into court, the
plaintiff must pay the defendant's costs and fees from the date of the payment into court. Id.
at 307, 310.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
12. See Varon, supra note 3, at 816.
13. See Simon, supra note 3, at 1-2.
14. In re The Florida Bar- Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So. 2d 21, 22, 40-41 (Fla. 1972)
(promulgating rule 1.442, which became effective on Jan. 1, 1973). A 1980 amendment to the
rule clarified filing procedures and excluded from the rule's operation any actions or matters
relating to dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsupport, or child custody. The Florida Bar: In
re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 173-74 (Fla. 1980). The court made the exclusion
concerning domestic matters to avoid difficulties inherent in determining whether an offer is
"more favorable" in connection with domestic matters. Id. at 174.
15. The FloridaBar, 265 So. 2d at 41.
16. Id. at 40.
17.

Id.
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Perhaps in response to the insufficient sanctions under rule 1.442,18

the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statutes section 768.79 as
part of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986.19 Unlike the
original version of rule 1.442, section 768.79 provides for an award of
attorney's fees in addition to costs. 2 0 Furthermore, either party can
utilize section 768.79.21 Like the original version of rule 1.442, the
statute applies to all actions for damages, whether in tort or contract. 22
Moreover, sanctions are mandatory under section 768.79 if a divergence that is greater than twenty-five percent exists between the
offer made and the judgment ultimately obtained.2 However, in all
cases the statute grants the court the discretion to disallow the award
of costs and attorney's fees if the court determines that the offer was
not made in good faith.? Finally, section 768.79 prescribes six factors
which courts must consider in determining the reasonableness of an
award of attorney's fees.
Despite the existence of section 768.79, in 1987 the legislature
enacted Florida Statutes section 45.061, termed "Offers of Settlement. '' 26 Like section 768.79, either party may employ section 45.061
and the statute provides for attorney's fees as well as costs.- Section

18. See id. at 41 (committee note at the rule's adoption expressed doubts about the effectiveness of rule 1.442 based upon information about the ineffectiveness of rule 68); cf. Palmer,
Offers of Judgment, 92 CASE & COM. 22, 28 (1987) (describing the shortcomings of rule 68).
19. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, § 58, 1986 Fla. Laws 754 (codified
as FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1989)).

20.

FLA. STAT.

§ 768.79(1) (Supp. 1990).

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 768.79(6)(a)-(b).
24. Id. § 768.79(7)(a).
25. Id. § 768.79(7)(b). Along with "other relevant criteria," a court must consider the
following factors:
1. The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
2. The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
3. The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
4. Whether the (person making the offer) had unreasonably refused to furnish
information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.
5. Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of
far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
6. The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the (person making
the offer) reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
Id.
26. Act of July 1, 1987, ch. 87-249, §§ 1-2, 1987 Fla. Laws 1721 (codified as FLA. STAT.
§ 45.061 (1989)).

27.

FLA. STAT.

§ 45.061(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).
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45.061 applies to all but a few specifically enumerated civil actions. 28
As with section 768.79 sanctions, section 45.061 sanctions are mandatory if there is more than a twenty-five percent divergence between
the offer made and the judgment finally obtained.2 However, the
court has the discretion to award costs and fees to the offeror even
when the divergence between the offer and the judgment is less than
the twenty-five percent threshold.In addition to the differences described above, other procedural

variations existed among the original versions of the two statutes and

rule 1.442.31 These differences concerned the required form of offers,

the timing of offers and acceptances, the requirements for service,
the filing of offers and acceptances of offers, and the steps required

to enforce sanctions.as
Given the simultaneous existence of three offer of judgment provi-

sions with varying applicability, sanctions, and procedural requirements, it is not surprising that a great deal of confusion arose as to
which offer of judgment provisions parties should utilize in a particular
situation. The confusion was so extensive that some 'commentators

suggested that attorneys make offers of judgment under all three
provisions in order to assure the maximum benefit for the client.34 In
response to this confusion, the Florida Supreme Court in 1988 re-

quested that the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar
examine the potential conflicts among the offer of judgment rule and
the statutes. Thereafter, in response to a petition by the Civil Pro-

28. Id. § 45.061(4) (excluding class actions, shareholder derivative suits, or matters relating
to dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsupport, eminent domain, or child custody from the
statute's application).
29. Id. § 45.061(2).
30. Id.
31. See id. § 45.061; id. § 768.79; The FloridaBar, 265 So. 2d at 40-41 (promulgating the
original version of rule 1.442).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1989); id. § 768.79; The Florida Bar, 265 So. 2d at 40-41;
see also Ferrante, supra note 8, at 47-50 (describing in detail the procedural variations among
the three offer of judgment laws); Vocelle, supra note 8, at 10-14 (explaining the procedural
variations among the Florida offer of judgment provisions).
33. See Berman & Cole, supra note 8, at 38 (describing the confusion among practitioners
resulting from the availability of these three materially different provisions); Ferrante, supra
note 8, at 50-51 (describing from a defense perspective the confusion resulting from the interplay
of the three offer of judgment provisions); Vocelle, supra note 8, at 14 (advising that procedural
differences among the offer of judgment provisions can be a trap for the unwary).
34. See Berman & Cole, supra note 8, at 38.
35. The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442 (Offer of
Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442, 442 (Fla. 1989).
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cedure Rules Committee, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a new
version of rule 1.442 which became effective January 1, 1990.36
B.

The Supreme Court's Revision of Rule 1.442

Undoubtedly, the supreme court's revision of rule 1.442 will enhance the rule's ability to encourage settlement.37 Both plaintiffs and
defendants can employ the revised version of rule 1.442.8 While the
old rule only imposed costs as a sanction, the new rule provides for
attorney's fees and all reasonable costs of the litigation39 Additionally,
the revised rule expressly provides that costs are not limited to taxable
costs.40
A court may impose sanctions under the rule whenever an offer
of judgment is unreasonably refused and there is more than a twentyfive percent divergence between the offer and the judgment ultimately
obtained. 41 The rule also provides ten factors which courts may
examine in determining both the entitlement to and amount of sanctions.- The Florida Supreme Court rejected a Rules Committee recom-

36. Id. at 443.
37. The increase in sanctions from merely costs to include costs and attorney's fees will
likely increase the rule's effectiveness. See Berman & Cole, supra note 8, at 41 (assuming that
the offer of judgment laws can effectively reduce litigation, the supreme court's modifications
of rule 1.442 have come a long way in strengthening the rule's effectiveness). Increased predictability as a result of the change from an unreasonable rejection standard to an unreasonable
rejection plus 25% divergence standard combined with language defining what constitutes an
unreasonable rejection should also increase the rule's effectiveness. Id.
38. The Florida Bar, 550 So. 2d at 443. The revised rule states that "[a]n offer of judgment
may be made by any party or parties." Id.
39. Id. at 444.
40. Id. at 444 n.2.
41. Id. at 444. There must be both an unreasonable rejection and a 25% divergence between
offer and judgment ultimately obtained. Id.
42. Id. Along with any other relevant factors, a court may consider the following factors:
(A) the merit of the claim that was the subject of the offer;
(B) the number, nature, and quality of offers and counteroffers made by the parties;
(C) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue;
(D) whether a party unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary to
evaluate the reasonableness of an offer;
(E) whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of
far-reaching importance affecting nonparties;
(F) the fact that, at the time the offer was made and rejected, it was unlikely that
the rejection would result in unreasonable cost or delay;
(G) the fact that a party seeking sanctions has himself unreasonably rejected an
offer or counteroffer on the same issues or engaged in other unreasonable conduct;
(H) the fact that the proceeding in question essentially was equitable in nature;

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/2
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mendation to base the sanction on a percentage of the rejected offer.4 3
The court was concerned that a sanction calculated in this manner
would be seen as a substantive fne4
Although the Florida Supreme Court revised rule 1.442 to make
it more effective, the court did not simultaneously resolve the conflicts
between rule 1.442 and the offer of judgment statutes by addressing
whether the statutes are an unconstitutional invasion of the court's
procedural rulemaking power. 45 The court justified its refusal to ad-'

dress the constitutionality of the statutes by emphasizing the
nonadversarial nature of the Rules Committee's petition.46
Instead, the court ruled that only the procedural details of the
statutes impinge upon its exclusive rulemaking powers. 47 To the extent
that the procedural aspects of rule 1.442 are inconsistent with sections
768.79 and 45.061, the court declared that the rule supersedes the
statutes. 48 With one exception, the court did not specify which portions
of the rule and statutes were procedural and which portions were
substantive. 49 Therefore, subsequent courts are left with the task of
specifying precisely which portions of the statutes the rule supersedes °
(I) the lack of good faith underlying the offer; or
(J) the fact that the judgment was grossly disproportionate to the offer.
Id.
43. Id. at 442.
44. Id. The Rules Committee recommendation would have required a sanction equal to 15%
of an unaccepted offer to pay when the jury verdict is less than 75% of the offer and a sanction
equal to 15% of an unaccepted offer to accept when the jury verdict is more than 125% of the
offer. Id. The court feared that such a sanction would be seen as a sibstantive fine, especially
when a party did nothing more serious than guess wrong about a jury verdict. Id.
45. Id. at 443. The court expressly refused to address the constitutionality of the substantive
aspects of the offer of judgment statutes. Id.
46. Id. Case law supports the court's refusal to address constitutionality in a nonadversarial
proceeding. See, e.g., Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. 1951) (recognizing the "well
established principle" that courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is challenged
directly by one affected by the statute). However, the court has not consistently adhered to
this doctrine. See In re The Florida Bar - Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla.
1973), nwdifiled, 348 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1977) (declaring statutes unconstitutional despite the lack
of an adversarial proceeding); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 63 So. 2d 321, 326 (Fla.
1953) (declaring statutes unconstitutional in response to a nonadversarial request for an advisory
opinion from the governor).
47. The Florid&Bar, 550 So. 2d at 443.
48. Id.
49. Id. The only portions of the statutes which the court expressly classified as procedural
were the time limits for accepting an offer of judgment. Id.
50. See Berman & Cole, supra note 8,at 40-41 (pointing out the difficulties the courts will
face in attempting to determine which aspects of the statutes are procedural and which are
substantive).
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Even when this classification process is completed, the confusion
will not end. The simultaneous existence of the rule and the substantive
aspects of the statutes not superseded by the rule will continue to
complicate Florida offer of judgment practice. 51 Recent amendments
to the offer of judgment- statutes have only served to exacerbate the
problem.
C.

Recent Amendments to the FloridaOffer of Judgment Statutes

Following the supreme court's revision of rule 1.442, the Florida
Legislature re-evaluated the offer of judgment statutes. Unfortunately, like the supreme court, the legislature chose not to invalidate
the statutes. Instead, the legislature amended both statutes in an
attempt to minimize conflicts among the three Florida offer of judgment provisions. 52
As amended, section 45.061 is now inapplicable to causes of action
which accrued subsequent to October 1, 1990.- The legislature made
no other changes to section 45.061. Section 768.79, however, received
more extensive revision.
Mindful of the supreme court's ruling that rule 1.442 supersedes
inconsistent procedural portions of the offer of judgment statutes,-'
the legislature amended section 768.79 in an attempt to achieve procedural consistency with rule 1.442. More specifically, section 768.79
now conforms with rule 1.442 with respect to service and filing of
offers,5 acceptance of offers,5 withdrawal of offers, 57 and the admissibility of evidence of an offer. 5 Additionally, the amount of sanctions
under section 768.79 is now to be calculated "in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court." 59 The amended version

51. See J. Regan, Recent Developments in Offer of Judgment Practice 3 (Dec. 1989) (unpublished lecture materials prepared in connection with the Jacksonville Bar Association's Continuing
Legal Education Seminar on Current Litigation Topics) (suggesting that even if the courts
quickly develop a uniform procedure for application of the offer of judgment laws, important
substantive differences between the laws will remain) (materials on file at the Florida Law

Review).
Act effective Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 90-119, § 22, 1990 Fla. Laws 370, 381-82; Act effective
1990, ch. 90-119, § 48, 1990 Fla. Laws 370, 400-02.
FLA. STAT. § 45.061(6) (Supp. 1990).
See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(3) (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.442(e).
See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(4) (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(f)(1).
See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(5) (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(g).
58. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(8) (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(i).
59. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(6)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1990). Presumably, this is a reference to the ten
factors which rule 1.442 requires courts to consider in determining the entitlement to and amount
52.
Oct. 1,
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

of sanctions. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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of section 768.79 is applicable only to causes of action accruing after
6
October 1, 1990. 0
Despite these changes, numerous differences remain between the
amended section 768.79 and rule 1.442. The legislature made no change
to the basic sanction entitlement provisions of section 768.79. As before, the court imposes sanctions under section 768.79 when a twentyfive percent divergence exist between the offer and the judgment
ultimately obtained. 61 Rule 1.442, on the other hand, requires both a
finding that the offeree unreasonably rejected the offer and a twentyfive percent divergence between the offer and the judgment.62 Other
differences between the amended section 768.79 and rule 1.442 relate
to offer time requirements,6 form of offers,r and the effect of counteroffers.
The legislature did not eliminate the source of the current confusion
in Florida offer of judgment practice by amending the offer of judgment
statutes. Significant differences continue to exist between both offer
of judgment statutes and rule 1.442. As a result, courts still must
determine which portions of the offer of judgment statutes are procedural. ,6 Furthermore, section 45.061 and the pre-amendment version
of section 768.79 are still fully applicable to causes of action which
accrued prior to October 1, 1990.67 Therefore, the legislature has
further complicated offer of judgment practice. Litigants must now
pinpoint when a cause of action accrued so as to determine whether
section 45.061 is applicable and which version of section 768.79 is
applicable. In order to efficiently resolve this problem, the Florida

60.

See Act effective Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 90-119, § 55, 1990 Fla. Laws 370, 403. Florida courts

have consistently declared that §§ 45.061 and 768.79 do not apply to causes of action which
accrued before their effective dates. See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Bono, 564 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla.
5th D.C.A. 1990).
61. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(6)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1990).
62. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.442(h)(1)(A)-(B).
63. Rule 1.442 requires that an offer of judgment "be served no sooner than 60 days after

the offeree has filed its first paper in the action and no later than 60 days prior to trial." FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.442(b). Section 768.79 contains no such requirement. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79
(Supp. 1990).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(2)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2).

65.

Rule 1.442 provides that "a counteroffer operates as a rejection of an unexpired offer

or an unexpired counteroffer." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(f)(2). Section 768.79 contains no such

provision. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (Supp. 1990).
66. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties inherent
in such a classification process.

67. See supra notes 53 & 60 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court must expressly invalidate the offer of judgment statutes. This move is justified because the correct analysis reveals that
the statutes are improper procedural legislative enactments.6

II.
A.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FLORIDA OFFER OF
JUDGMENT STATUTES

Exclusive Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court

The Florida Constitution grants the Florida Supreme Court the
power to adopt rules governing practice and procedure in all state
courts. 69 The constitutional provision bestowing this power does not
explicitly state that the supreme court's rulemaking power is exclusive. 70 However, the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution provides that no power appertaining to one branch of government shall be exercised by any person belonging to another branch
of government. 7'1 Therefore, the Florida Constitution implicitly denies
the legislature the power to make rules governing practice and procedure in the state courts.72 Case law construing these constitutional
provisions confirms that rules governing practice and procedure are
within the exclusive province of the Florida Supreme Court.m
The Florida Supreme Court's rulemaking power is not without
limits. Court rules cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive
rights of any litigant7 4 However, the Florida Constitution does not

68. See infra notes 169-93 and accompanying text.
69. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2. Rules which the court adopts may be repealed by a two-thirds
vote of both houses of the Florida Legislature. Id.
70. See id. Although article V merely states that the supreme court "shall adopt rules for
the practice and procedure in all courts," the constitution does not expressly deny procedural
rulemaking power to the other branches of state government. Id.
71. Id. art. II, § 3.
72. See Wilson, Dreisbach, Brodnax & Bowden, The Florida Appellate Rules, 11 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1958) (stating that "the [Florida] Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure ... impliedly denies any authority, even subordinate, for the legislature
to act in this field"). See generally 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 169 (1979) (explaining
that the Florida Constitution vests the sole power to prescribe rules for practice and procedure
in the Florida Supreme Court (citing Bluesten v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567
(Fla. 1960))).
73. See In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice & Procedure (Fla. Const. art. V, §
2(a)), 281 So. 2d 204, 204-05 (Fla. 1973) (stating that since the supreme court is given exclusive
authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, the legislature cannot amend or supersede a court rule, even though the legislature may repeal the rule by a two thirds vote); Bluesten
v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1960) (holding that the constitution
vests the sole power to prescribe rules for practice and procedure for courts in the supreme court).
74. See Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975); State v. Furen, 118 So.
2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1960); Lundstrom v. Lyon, 86 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1956); see generally 13 FLA.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/2

10

Wright: Confusion in Florida Offer of Judgement Practice: Resolving the C
FLORIDA OFFER OF JUDGMENT PRACTICE

explicitly impose this limitation upon the court's rulemaking power. 75

Instead, as with the prohibition against procedural legislative enactments, 76 this limitation is implied by the separation of powers provision

of the constitution.As a result of these implied constraints, the constitutionality of a
court rule or statute depends upon whether the provision is substantive
or procedural in character.7 Unfortunately, the dividing line between
substance and procedure often is blurry at best.79 The most concerted

efforts by the Florida courts to differentiate between substance and
procedure produce mere generalizations. These efforts are of little

practical assistance in distinguishing a constitutional substantive statute from an unconstitutional procedural statute. s0 Indeed, the Florida
Supreme Court expressly has recognized this dilemma, referring to a
"hiatus" or "twilight zone" between substance and procedure, into

which the courts and the legislature constantly enter.81
The elusive nature of the substance/procedure distinction is reflected in the decisions of Florida courts. When a case involves a

statute which is undeniably procedural, the courts have been willing

JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 169 (1979) (stating that the supreme court's authority to adopt
rules governing practice and procedure is subject to the implicit limitation that the rules neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant (citing Furen, 118 So. 2d at

12)).
75. Furen, 118 So. 2d at 12.
76. See supra notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text.
77. Furen, 118 So. 2d at 12.
78. See State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969) (holding that since the court rule
governing the waiver of a jury trial was procedural, the court rule superseded a conflicting
statute); Furen, 118 So. 2d at 11-12 (holding that since the court rule making commission or
board rulings appealable by certiorari was substantive, a conflicting statute superseded the
court rule).
79. See generally Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A
Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14-24 (exploring the difficulties of
distinguishing between substance and procedure in order to determine the legislature's proper
role in rulemaking).
80. See, e.g., Benyard, 322 So. 2d at 475 (stating that substantive law prescribes the duties
and rights under our system of government, while procedural law concerns the means and
method to apply and enforce those duties and rights); Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238 (stating that
substantive law creates, defines, and regulates rights, while procedural law is the legal machinery
which effects and enforces substantive law); Furen, 118 So. 2d at 12 (distinguishing between
procedural law which processes and enforces a legal right and substantive law which defines a
legal right).
81. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972); In re
Florida State Bar Ass'n For Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 145 Fla. 223,
228, 199 So. 57, 59 (1940).
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to invalidate the statute.1 However, on at least one occasion, a Florida
court upheld a statute which had the primary purpose of regulating
court procedure, because the statute also created a shift of attorney's
fees.The Florida courts also have been unwilling to invalidate a procedural statute that conflicts with a rule of civil procedure dealing
with the same subject. Instead, the courts usually prefer to avoid the
question, declaring that the rule supersedes only the procedural details
of the statute that conflict with the rule.1 As previously discussed,
this was the Florida Supreme Court's approach in its decision revising
rule 1.442.Although statutory support for the Florida Supreme Court's solution exists,6 the court's approach merely begs the question. It still is
necessary for the courts to address individually each provision of the
statutes and determine whether the provision is substantive or procedural.87 In the case of the offer of judgment statutes, such inquiry
probably will reveal that the only substantive portion of the statutes

82. See, e.g., Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1978) (invalidating a statute
governing the timing of joinder during the course of trial which was "without question" a matter
of practice or procedure exclusively within the supreme court's rulemaking power); State v.
Smith, 260 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1972) (voiding a statute which purported to grant interlocutory
appeals); Military Park Fire Control Tax Dist. No. 4 v. DeMarois, 407 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1981) (invalidating a statute since "[t]here can be no doubt" that a rule prioritizing
civil matters to be processed by the state courts was procedural rather than substantive).
83. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 1982) (finding that
a statute providing for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any civil action
in which the court finds that the losing party failed to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact
was substantive and, therefore, a proper legislative enactment). For a criticism of the basis for
the Whitten court's holding, see infra note 183.
84. See, e.g., Garcia,229 So. 2d at 238-39 (holding that a rule of criminal procedure governing
the waiver of a jury trial by a criminal defendant superseded a statute covering the same subject
only to the extent that the rule and statute were in conflict); Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka,
149 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1963) (holding that a rule of appellate procedure superseded a statute
governing certification of questions to the supreme court and district courts of appeal only to
the extent that the rule and statute were inconsistent); see also Means, The Power to Regulate
Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 442, 482 (1980) (explaining
that supreme court findings that a procedural statute merely is superseded by a conflicting rule
of procedure is inconsistent with the court's position that its rulemaking power is exclusive).
85. The Florida Bar, 550 So. 2d at 443. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
86. See FLA. STAT. § 25.371 (1989) (declaring that "[w]hen a rule is adopted by the Supreme
Court concerning practice and procedure, and such rule conflicts with a statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision"). But see Means, supra note 84, at 481 (claiming that current
wording of the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority to the supreme court renders §
25.371 superfluous).
87. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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are the remedies. The courts likely will determine that the balance
of the statutes are procedural and superseded by the rule." Because
the offer of judgment statutes are overwhelmingly procedural, 89 this
piecemeal approach to de facto invalidation of the statutes seems a
blatant misuse of judicial resources - the very evil the offer of judgment rules were designed to prevent. 90
B.

Constitutionality of the Florida Offer of Judgment Statutes The DCA Split

In the wake of the Florida Supreme Court's refusal to address the
constitutionality of the offer of judgment statutes, the district courts
of appeal have been left to grapple with the question. The result has
been disagreement among the district courts as to whether section
45.061 is an unconstitutional invasion of the supreme court's exclusive
rulemaking power.9 1Ultimately, it will be left to the Florida Supreme
Court to resolve this conflict.9
In Milton v. Leapai,9 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that
section 45.061 is an unconstitutional invasion of the Florida Supreme
Court's exclusive rulemaking power.9 The Milton court defined a substantive law as one which "creates, defines, and regulates rights." 95
The court defined a procedural law as one which "prescribes a method
of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion."' Based
88. Berman & Cole, supra note 8, at 40.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
90. See Aspen, 564 So. 2d at 1083 (stating that the purpose of the offer of judgment rule
and statutes is to encourage parties to settle claims without going to trial); Unicare Health
Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989) (stating that rule 1.442 was implemented
to encourage settlement if possible in order to eliminate trials); Cheek, 511 So. 2d at 981 (stating
that the purpose of rule 1.442 is to encourage settlement and eliminate trials whenever possible).
91. See A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Davis, 559 So. 2d 235, 236-37 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1990)
(holding that § 45.061 is constitutional since it creates substantive rights); Milton v. Leapai,
562 So. 2d 804, 807-08 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1990) (holding that § 45.061 is an unconstitutional
invasion of exclusive supreme court rulemaking power).
92. Recently, the First District Court of Appeal declared § 768.79 to be unconstitutional
and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. Hughes v. Gooisby, 578 So. 2d 348,
349 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1991). The Hughes court certified the following question: "WHETHER
THE LEGISLATURE'S ENACTMENT OF SECTION 768.79, FLORIDA STATUTES, CONSTITUTED THE ADOPTION OF A RULE OF PROCEDURE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
V, SECTION 2(a) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION." Id.
93. 562 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1990).
94. Id. at 807-08. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reaffirmed its holding that § 45.061
is unconstitutional. Curenton v. Chester, 576 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1991) (citing
Milton, 562 So. 2d at 804).
95. Milton, 562 So. 2d at 807.
96. Id.
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upon the constitutional grant of rulemaking power to the supreme
court 97 and the separation of powers clause, 98 the Milton court declared
that a statute purporting to create or modify a procedural rule of
court or practice is unconstitutional.The Milton court reasoned that, in declaring that rule 1.442 supersedes sections 768.79 and 45.061 to the extent that the procedural
aspects of the rule conflict with the statutes, the Florida Supreme
Court clearly determined that section 45.061 contains both substantive
and procedural elements. - According to the Milton court, the improper procedural provisions of section 45.061 could not be severed from
the statute without rendering it incomplete or causing results that
the legislature had not anticipated.101 Therefore, the Milton court held
01 2
that the entire statute was unconstitutional.
In reaching this conclusion, the Milton court acknowledged that it
was in conflict with the second district. 10 3 The Second District Court
of Appeal determined that section 45.061 was constitutional in A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Davis.- More specifically, the court ruled
that since subsections 45.061(2) and (3) create substantive rights, the
statute did not infringe upon the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking
authority. 0 5 However, the Milton court reasoned that the second district's ruling was inconsistent with the supreme court's determination
that section 45.061 contains procedural details.0*
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered whether section 45.061 was procedural or substantive in Hemmerle v. Bramalea,
Inc.107 Unlike the Milton and Davis courts, the Hemmerle court did
not consider the constitutionality of section 45.061.108 However, the

97. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
98. Id. art. II, § 3.
99. Milton, 562 So. 2d at 807.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 807-08.
102. Id. (citing Delta Air Lines v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1984),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); High Ridge Mgmt. Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla.
1977)).
103. Id. at 808 n.4.
104. 559 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1990).
105. Id. at 236-37 (citing Richardson v. Honda Motor Co., 686 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Fla.
1988); Hemmerle v. Bramalea, Inc., 547 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1989)). Subsections 45.061(2)
and (3) deal with entitlement to and amount of sanctions. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(2)-(3).
106. Milton, 562 So. 2d at 808 n.4.
107. 547 So. 2d 203, 204 (4th D.C.A. 1989), rev. denied, 558 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 2620 (1990).
108. See id. at 204. The Hemmerle court restricted its inquiry to whether § 45.061 should
be given retroactive application. Id.
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court did rule that section 45.061 was substantive in nature and, therefore, could not be applied retroactively to causes of action accruing
before the effective date of the statute. 10
Both Davis and Hemmerle based the finding that section 45.061
is substantivelo upon a case decided by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Richardsonv. Honda Motor
Co.,,, As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Richardson court
applied Florida substantive law. 112 The court noted that, under Florida
law, each litigant is obligated to pay its own attorney's fees unless a
statute or agreement between the parties awards the right to assess
fees against the opposing party. 13 The court also noted that the Florida
Supreme Court had previously held that a statute which requires a
nonprevailing party to pay attorney's fees constitutes a new obligation
or duty and is therefore substantive in nature.14
Section 45.061 allows the court to assess attorney's fees against a
party who unreasonably rejects an offer of judgment, a right which
previously did not exist in Florida. 115 Therefore, the Richardsoncourt
held that section 45.061 is substantive.116 Consequently, the court refused to apply section 45.061 to the plaintiffs cause of action which
accrued prior to the effective date of the statute.11 7
C. Fee-Shifting Statutes: Are They Substantive or Procedural?
The Davis court's determination that section 45.061 is substantive,
and thus constitutional, is misguided. In order to identify the flaw in

109.

Id. (citing Richardson, 686 F. Supp. at 303). The Fourth District also later declared

that § 768.79 was substantive and did not apply retroactively. Mudano v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 876, 877 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1989). A distinction between substance and
procedure also determines whether a statute can be applied to a cause of action retroactively;
however, the substance/procedure determination is based upon different factors in the retroactive
application context than in the separation of powers context. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
110.
111.

See Davis, 559 So. 2d at 237; Hemmerle, 547 So. 2d at 204.
686 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Fla. 1988).

112. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (stating that "except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State").
113. Id. at 304 (citing Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985)).
114. Id. (citing L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 481 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1986);
Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1982); Parrish v. Mullis, 458
So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984); Love v. Jacobson, 390 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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the court's reasoning, some general principles must be recognized.
First, laws which require one litigant to pay the opposing litigant's
attorney's fees may be either substantive or procedural.118 Second,
fee-shifting statutes which are procedural tend to apply to both litigants and are designed to make the litigation process more efficient
for both parties, rather than to favor a particular cause of action or
class of litigant. 119 Third, substantive fee-shifting statutes normally
are tied directly to specific causes of action, thus encouraging such
1
claims by making attorney's fees available to prevailing plaintiffs. 20
A review of federal case law concerning fee-shifting statutes reveals
that federal courts considering the separation of powers question have
adopted these principles. For example, Marek v. Chesny121 was a suit
brought in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.1Before trial, the petitioners made a timely offer of judgment of
$100,000 under rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. '1 The
respondent rejected the offer and was ultimately awarded $60,000.1The respondent then moved for an award of attorney's fees under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. section
1988.1?
Section 1988 provides for an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff in a section 1983 action. 126 Alternately, section 1988 provides
for an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in cases in

118. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further Substance/Procedure
Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. Pir. L. REV. 393, 394 (1988) (arguing that given
the existence of several different rationales underlying fee shifting statutes, a court may characterize a fee-shifting provision as either substantive or procedural).
119. Id. at 397, 401 (asserting that procedural fee shifting laws are "tied to the judicial
processes available for resolving disputes about claims or causes of action" and 'typically govern
conduct during litigation, often by permitting recovery of fees from those who abuse the judicial
process"); see also Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 281, 303 (stating that "civil rules generally are written to apply without regard to
the substantive nature of the issues in dispute").
120. Parness, supra note 118, at 397, 401 (asserting that substantive fee-shifting laws are
"tied to claims or causes of action" and often encourage "assertions of these claims by providing
that prevailing complainants are entitled to recovery of fees").
121. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 3-4. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs offers of judgment.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
124. Marek, 473 U.S. at 4.
125. Id. at 9.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (providing that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/2

16

Wright: Confusion in Florida Offer of Judgement Practice: Resolving the C
FLORIDA OFFER OF JUDGMENT PRACTICE

127
which the plaintiff has engaged in substantial litigation misconduct.
The petitioners argued that the respondent was not entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988, because the rule 68 offer of judgment
had shifted attorney's fees to the respondent." The district court
agreed with the petitioners and refused to award the respondent costs
and attorney's fees incurred after the offer of judgment.29
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling."' The appellate court concluded that the right to attorney's fees created by section 1988 is substantive for some purposes
and procedural for others. 3' According to the court, the fee-shifting
provisions of section 1988 are procedural because they govern the
relationship between the parties to a lawsuit and make the litigation
process more accurate and efficient by providing a prevailing defendant
with fees if the plaintiff engages in litigation misconduct."32 The same
fee-shifting provisions are substantive because they are designed to
achieve compliance with civil rights laws by providing a prevailing
plaintiff with fees. 1" The court of appeals held that applying rule 68
to prevent respondent from recovering costs and attorney's fees incurred after the offer of judgment would abridge the substantive right
to attorney's fees granted by section 1988."34 In the court's view, such
a result would be a violation of the Rules Enabling Act."'
6
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed'
and held that applying rule 68 to prevent respondent from recovering
costs and fees accruing after the offer of judgment would not abridge
substantive rights. 137 In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered
the objectives underlying rule 68 and section 1988 sanctions." 8 Rule

127. Id.
128. Marek, 473 U.S. at 4.
129. Id.
130. Chesney v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
131. Id. at 479 (finding that 'no doubt the right is better described as both substantive
and procedural, or as substantive for some purposes and procedural for others").
132. Id.

133. Id. at 478-79.
134. Id. at 479.
135. Id. The Rules Enabling Act provides the United States Supreme Court with the power
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in the United States district courts and courts of
appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988). The Rules Enabling Act also provides that "such rules may
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Id. § 2072(b).
136. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id. (stating that § 1988 has the purpose of encouraging plaintiffs to bring meritorious
civil rights suits, while rule 68 has the purpose of encouraging parties to settle all suits).
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68 is intended to discourage a plaintiff from continuing litigation after

the defendant has made an offer of judgment. 139 The Court noted that
there was no evidence indicating that Congress, in enacting rule 68,
wished to favor civil rights claims over other civil claims.140 Further-

more, rule 68's policy of encouraging settlements is neutral and favors
neither plaintiffs nor defendants.141 The Court perceived no conflict
between section 1988's objective of encouraging meritorious civil rights
suits and rule 68's goal of encouraging settlement?4 Thus, the Court
held that awarding attorney's fees under rule 68 did not abridge substantive rights.14
In Marek, the Supreme Court determined that rule 68 did not
abridge substantive rights because the rule seeks to make the litigation

process more efficient for both parties by encouraging settlement in
all civil actions.- In addition, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that section 1988 is substantive to the extent that it at-

tempts to encourage civil rights actions. 145 The combination of these
two decisions supports the generalizations concerning fee-shifting laws
6
presented above.14

Specifically, fee-shifting statutes which directly affect a particular
type of action or class of litigants are characterized as substantive,
especially when the statute attempts to encourage a particular cause
of action.1 7 Such fee-shifting statutes are correctly seen as merely a
part of the relief offered by the underlying substantive action.148 On

139. Id. at 10.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 11 (finding that, "Section 1988 encourages plaintiffs to bring meritorious civil
rights suits; [r]ule 68 simply encourages settlements. There is nothing incompatible in the two
objectives.").
143. Id.
144. Id. at 10 (stating that, "Civil rights plaintiffs - along with other plaintiffs - who
reject an offer more favorable than what is thereafter recovered at trial will not recover attorney's
fees for services performed after the offer is rejected.").
145. Chesny, 720 F.2d at 479 (finding that § 1988 was designed to achieve the substantive
objective of compliance with the civil rights laws). The Supreme Court did not declare that the
court of appeals improperly determined that § 1988 was substantive; the Court merely declared
that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that rule 68 impinged upon the substantive rights
created by § 1988. Marek, 473 U.S. at 10-11.
146. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
147. See Parness, supra note 118, at 401 (reaching the same conclusion based upon a similar
interpretation of the Marek court of appeal and Supreme Court holdings).
148. See Orlando Candy Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 51 F.2d 392, 393 (S.D. Fla.
1931) (holding that a state statute was properly applied in federal court because "the liability
imposed by the statute . . . is in effect an incident of the insurer's wrongful refusal to pay").
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the other hand, fee-shifting statutes applying equally to a wide crosssection of civil cases, which have the purpose of making the litigation
process more efficient for both parties and governing the relationship
149
between the parties, are properly classified as procedural.
The United States Supreme Court previously had endorsed this
approach to distinguishing between substantive and procedural feeshifting statutes in People of Sioux County, Nebraska v. National
Surety Co. 15 In Sioux County, the Court considered whether a federal
court could properly apply a Nebraska statute allowing recovery by
a beneficiary against a surety in the amount of the surety bond plus
a reasonable attorney's fee. 151 The Court declared that the issue of
whether a federal court could enforce a state fee-shifting statute did
may be taken between the
not "depend on any nice distinctions which
'
right created and the remedy given. 152
Thus, the Court did not consider only whether the statute created
a legal liability which did not exist under the contract prior to the
enactment of the statute.lca Rather, the Court examined the purpose
underlying the fee shift.'5 The Nebraska Legislature enacted the statute to allow plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees in connection with a
specific cause of action.c Therefore, the Court held that the federal
court properly applied the statute.'5
The implications of the Sioux County holding are clear. First,
fee-shifting statutes may be either substantive or procedural.1 57 Second, courts must distinguish substantive fee shifting laws from procedural ones based upon the purpose of the fee shift, not upon the
creation of a new liability Where none had existed previously. 158 Third,

149.

See Parness, supra note 118, at 401 (concluding that under the Marek holdings, pro-

cedural fee-shifting laws typically govern conduct during litigation by permitting recovery of
fees against those abusing the judicial process).
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

276 U.S. 238 (1928).
Id. at 242-48.
Id. at 243.
Id.
See id.
Id.

156. Id. The court declared that it would be anomalous if plaintiffs could thwart this clear
policy of the state by removal to federal court. Id.
157. See id.

158. See Parness, supra note 118, at 405 (arguing that implicit in the Sioux County holding
is the assertion that a liability to compensate an opponent, imposed as a procedural incident to
the entry of judgment, is not substantive merely because it creates a right of recovery).
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a federal court may apply only state fee-shifting statutes that are
substantive. 159
In Orlando Candy Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co.,160
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
further clarified the distinction between substantive and procedural
fee-shifting statutes. The Orlando Candy court considered whether a
federal court could apply a statute which shifted attorney's fees in
favor of a beneficiary seeking to collect on an insurance policy.161 The
court concluded that the liability for attorney's fees imposed by the
statute was "an incident of the insurer's wrongful refusal to pay, not
a mere procedural incident to the entry of the judgment.' 16 Therefore,
the court held that the statute was substantive and properly applied
in federal court. 16
A number of basic guidelines for applying fee-shifting statutes may
be distilled from the Marek, Sioux County, and Orlando Candy holdings. Namely, fee-shifting statutes may be either substantive or procedural.'- A fee-shifting statute which creates a new right or remedy
where none previously existed is not necessarily substantive.Instead, the purpose underlying the fee shift determines whether
the statute is substantive.'6 If the fee shift is directly connected with
a particular substantive cause of action, perhaps to encourage the
bringing of such actions, the provision is an extension of the underlying
action and creates a substantive right. 67 However, if the fee shift is
designed to achieve more efficient administration of justice in a wide
range of civil actions and does not encourage the bringing of a particular action, the provision is merely a procedural incident to the entry
of judgment. -

159. See Sioux County, 276 U.S. at 243; see also Parness, supra note 118, at 404 (determining that "[c]ourts can only interpret Sioux County as requiring federal courts hearing state law
claims to apply state substantive... laws on fee-shifting and not all state fee-shifting laws").
160. 51 F.2d 392 (S.D. Fla. 1931).
161. Id. at 392.
162. Id. at 393.

163.

Id.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 118 & 144-49 and accompanying text.
supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
supra notes 138-49 & 158 and accompanying text.
id.
id.
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D.

The Florida Offer of Judgment Statutes: Are They Substantive
or Procedural?

Based on the preceding guidelines, a federal court likely would
conclude that sections 45.061 and 768.79 are procedural. As with the
federal offer of judgment rule, these statutes attempt to make the
litigation process more efficient for both parties by deterring nonmeritorious litigation and encouraging prompt settlement. 16 Section
768.79 applies to all actions for damages, whether in tort or in contract. 170 Section 45.061 applies to all actions at law or in chancery with
a few notable exceptions.' 7 ' Therefore, neither statute encourages the
filing of any particular substantive cause of action. Both statutes result
in fee shifts which are merely procedural incidents to the entry of
judgment, rather than substantive incidents of a plaintiffs underlying
cause of action.
If federal courts have adopted these rules for distinguishing between procedural and substantive fee-shifting statutes, it is confusing
why the district court in Richardson reached the conclusion, later
relied upon by Hemmerle and Davis, that section 45.061 is substantive.rs One explanation is that the Richardson court confronted an
issue different than the issue confronting the other federal courts when
they made the substance/procedure determination. The substance/procedure classification in Richardson was not made in a separation of
powers context. Instead, the issue in Richardsonwas whether section
45.061 should be applied retroactively. 17
The substance/procedure classification is not necessarily based upon
the same considerations in both the separation of powers and retroactive application contexts. 74 In a case concerning retroactive application

169. See supra note 90.
170. FLA. STAT. § 768.71(1) (1989).
171. Id. § 45.061(4). Section 45.061 does not apply to "any class action or shareholder
derivative suit or to matters relating to dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsupport, eminent
domain, or child custody." Id.
172. Richardson, 686 F. Supp. at 304 (holding that § 45.061 is a substantive statute which
cannot apply retroactively).
173. Id.
174. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108, reh'g denied, 326 U.S. 806 (1945)
(finding that "of course, 'substance' and 'procedure' are the same key-words to very different
problems" and that "[e]ach implies different variables depending upon the particular problem
for which it is used"); In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972)
(finding that "a statute or rule will be characterized as substantive or procedural according to
the nature of the problem for which a characterization must be made"); In re Florida State Bar
Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 145 Fla. 223, 228, 199 So. 57, 59
(1940) (finding that "what is regarded as substantive law today may become procedural law
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of a statute, the court seeks to prevent a statute which creates or
takes away vested rights from being applied to conduct which occurred
before the statute was enacted and before the parties were put on
notice.176 Therefore, a substantive statute in the retroactive application
context is one which establishes a new right or liability where none
previously existed. 176 Conversely, in the separation of powers setting,
the court seeks to prevent the legislature from improperly infringing
upon the supreme court's constitutional rulemaking power.'1 Thus, in
a separation of powers context, the concern focuses on the purpose
underlying the fee shift. 178
The Hemmerle court was addressing the question of retroactive
application when it determined section 45.061 to be substantive. 179
Thus, the court's reliance upon the Richardson holding arguably is
proper. However, the Davis court was confronted with a separation
of powers issue when it held section 45.061 to be substantive and
constitutional. 180 Therefore, the Davis court's reliance upon
Richardson,which addressed the substantive/procedural nature of section 45.061 in an entirely different context, was misplaced. Although
section 45.061 is conceivably substantive in the retroactive application

tomorrow and vice versa"); Carrington, supra note 119, at 284 (explaining that the "characterization of a law as substantive or procedural depends on the purpose of the characterization");
see generally Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333,
341 (1933) (asserting that the substance/procedure "distinction is drawn for a number of different
purposes, each involving its own social, economic, or political problems").
175. See Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985) (finding that a statute did
not apply retroactively because "[v]hen appellant's cause of action accrued, she was not burdened
with the potential responsibility to pay ... attorney's fees ...
and appellee was not entitled
to that right") (quoting Parrish v. Mullis, 458 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984))); Parrish,
458 So. 2d at 402 (finding that "it would be manifestly unfair to argue that plaintiff could have
filed her lawsuit earlier to avoid operation of the statute" because on the date the cause of
action accrued the statute did not exist); Cook, supra note 174, at 343 (stating that the alteration
of an individual's "vested substantive rights" by subsequent legislative enactment is not fair).
176. See, e.g., L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 481 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1986)
(finding that statutes which do not create a new right or take away a vested right are merely
remedial and may be given retroactive application); Love v. Jacobson, 390 So. 2d 782, 783 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1980) (holding that a statute was substantive because the right to attorney's fees
created by the statute did not exist prior to enactment of the statute).
177. See Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1006 (holding that a procedural statute was an invasion of
the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking authority); Military Park, 407 So. 2d at 1021 (recognizing that procedural statutes violate the separation of powers provision of the Florida Constitution).
178. See supra notes 118-63 and accompanying text.
179. Hemmerle, 547 So. 2d at 204.
180. Davis, 559 So. 2d at 236-37.
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context, 181 analysis of the section 45.061 fee shift reveals that the
statute is procedural in the separation of powers setting. 18 Other
Florida courts also have failed to consider the context of the challenge
to a statute when characterizing the statute as substantive or procedural. 11
A Florida court did hold that section 45.061 was an unconstitutional
infringement upon the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive rulemaking
power in Milton v. Leapai.'1 Unfortunately, Milton reaches the correct result for the wrong reasons. The court declared that section
45.061 contains both substantive and procedural elements.'5 Because
the substantive portions of the statute could not be severed from the

181. Florida courts have universally declared that statutes incorporating fee shifts create
rights and liabilities where none existed before and, therefore, are substantive enactments which
may not be applied retroactively. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. But see Brady v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 610 F. Supp. 735, 744 (D. Md. 1985) (finding that a fee shift under rule
11 may be given retroactive application because it does not create a new substantive right or
affect substantive rights previously existing).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
183. See, e.g., Whitten, 410 So. 2d at 504. In 1982, the Florida Supreme Court determined
that an award of attorney's fees under § 57.105 of the Florida Statutes was a matter of substantive
law properly under the authority of the legislature. Id. The supreme court relied on a number
of cases which declared that litigants cannot recover attorney fees unless allowed by statute or
contract. Id. (citing Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild - Florida Constr. Co., 341 So. 2d 759
(Fla. 1976); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1976); Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employer's
Serv. Corp., 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1973); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1956); State
ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168, 99 So. 668 (1924)). Therefore, the Whitten court
also ignored the context-sensitive nature of the substance/procedure determination when it
declared that § 57.105 was substantive for separation of powers purposes simply because it
created new rights and liabilities. See Parness, supra note 118, at 418 n.121 (arguing that the
Whitten court improperly declared that the statute was substantive in the separation of powers
setting merely because the statute created a liability).
Federal courts have also occasionally made the substance/procedure determination without
considering the context of the determination. See Brady, 610 F. Supp. at 744. In Brady, the
court declared that rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was substantive and could
be applied retroactively. Id. The court declared that rule 11 was substantive because the purpose
underlying the rule's fee shift was to control the conduct of litigation and counsel appearing
before the court. Id. However, the purpose of the fee shift is relevant only in the separation
of powers setting. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Brady court
failed to recognize the significance of context in making the substance/procedure determination
and declared rule 11 procedural in a retroactive application context based upon factors relevant
only in a separation of powers context. See generally Cook, supra note 174, at 344-45 (generally
discussing the problems inherent in using a substance/procedure determination in a context
different from the context in which it was originally made).
184. 562 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1990).
185. Id. at 807.
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procedural portions without defeating legislative intent, the court ruled
that the entire statute was invalid.'
The Milton court based its decision on the Florida Supreme Court's
earlier ruling that rule 1.442 contains both substantive and procedural
details. 187 With one exception, the supreme court failed to explain
which elements of the statutes were procedural.18 Therefore, it was
somewhat conclusory for the Milton court to hold that severing the
substantive elements of section 45.061 from the procedural elements
would defeat legislative intent when the procedural elements were
never identified. Furthermore, under the Milton court's analysis, rule
1.442 is also unconstitutional because it contains substantive components which cannot be severed from the procedural portions.- As a
result, under the Milton court's reasoning, both the supreme court
and the legislature would be incapable of enacting an offer of judgment
provision capable of withstanding constitutional evaluation.
The only effective means of eliminating the confusion currently
plaguing Florida offer of judgment practice is for the Florida Supreme
Court to invalidate the offer of judgment statutes. However, the court
need not adopt the reasoning of Milton and invalidate the offer of
judgment statutes based upon strained arguments of partial unconstitutionality and inseverability. Both Florida offer of judgment statutes attempt to make the litigation process more efficient for all parties
by encouraging settlement and deterring frivolous litigation.190 Both
are also intended to apply in a wide range of civil actions.19' Therefore,
at least in the separation of powers context, '1 the offer of judgment

186. Id. (citing Delta Air Lines v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1984),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); High Ridge Mgmt. Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla.
1977)).
187. Id. (citing The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442
(Offer of Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989)).
188. See The Florida Bar, 550 So. 2d at 443 (explicitly declaring that only the time limits
for acceptance of offers under the statutes are procedural).
189. See Furen, 118 So. 2d at 12 (holding that the rules of procedure may not abridge,
modify, or enlarge substantive rights); see also Reinhardt v. Bono, 564 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla.
5th D.C.A. 1990) (although acknowledging that the supreme court's opinion revising rule 1.442
could be construed to mean that sanctions under the rules and statutes are substantive, the
Reinhardt court refused to uphold the trial court's ruling that rule 1.442 violates separation of
powers because only the Florida Supreme Court has the authority to declare rules of civil
procedure invalid).
190. See supra note 90.
191. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the context-sensitive
nature of the substance/procedure classification.
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statutes are entirely procedural in character. As procedural enactments, the offer of judgment statutes are improper legislative promulgations of rules governing practice and procedure - a field the
Florida Constitution reserves exclusively for the Florida Supreme
Court.ye
III. ADDITIONAL FACTORS DICTATING INVALIDATION OF THE
FLORIDA OFFER OF JUDGMENT STATUTES

In view of the procedural nature of the offer of judgment statutes,
it is not only permissible, but essential that the supreme court invalidate the statutes. Complete invalidation is required to ensure that
both the legislature and the supreme court perform their proper constitutional roles. 194 Indeed, the supreme court is equally bound to find
a court rule designed to achieve substantive purposes unconstitutional. 95 If constitutional necessity does not persuade the court to
invalidate the statutes, both public policy and jurisprudential reality
should convince the court.
Simply declaring that rule 1.442 supersedes the procedural details
of the statutes, without identifying which elements of the statutes are
196
procedural, only further complicates the offer of judgment picture.
Florida courts will be forced to determine the substantive or procedural nature of each provision of the offer of judgment statutes on
a case-by-case basis.' 97 Courts making the substance/procedure determination based upon whether a new right or liability is conferred by
the statute probably will determine that the rule supersedes everything except the remedies provided by the statutes. 9 8 Thus, litigants

193. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text for a disucssion of the origins of the
Florida Supreme Court's exclusive authority over practice and procedure.
194. See id.; see also Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 37 (asserting that a faithful
adherence to the constitutional scheme is necessary to ensure that the legislature will not usurp
control of the supreme court's rulemaking power); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts,
12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926) (asserting that no branch of the government can work effectively
if the details of its procedural operations are dictated by another branch of the government).
195. See, e.g., Benyard, 322 So. 2d at 475-76 (finding that a rule governing the prescribed
punishment for a criminal offense is substantive and must be revoked or amended to conform
with the statute).
196. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
198. See Berman & Cole, supra note 8,at 40 (interpreting the supreme court's opinion
revising rule 1.442 'to infer that the only 'purely substantive aspect' of the statutes is the
sanction, or what the court might characterize as a substantive right conferred by the legislature").
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will have to follow the procedures dictated by the rule to gain the
benefit of the statutory remedies.199 Because the sanctions provided
for under the rule and statutes are now equivalent 2 00 there will be no
need for a litigant to resort to these statutory remedies. Nonetheless,
the validity of the statutory remedies will complicate Florida offer of
judgment practice.2 0 ' Therefore, unless the Florida Supreme Court
acknowledges the constitutional infirmity of the statutes, Florida offer
of judgment laws will continue to foster litigation in direct derogation
of their stated purpose. 2°2
Other practical considerations also dictate that the supreme court
exercise its exclusive power over procedure in the offer of judgment
area. As with all legislative enactments, the task of clarifying ambiguities in the offer of judgment statutes falls to the courts. Often,
the courts must resolve statutory ambiguity by relying on the literal
wording of a statute. Unfortunately, the literal interpretation often
conflicts with the purpose behind the statute.20
This was the case when the courts considered the question of
whether a defendant who makes an offer of judgment pursuant to
section 45.061 or section 768.79, and who later prevails in the underlying action, is entitled to the statutory remedy. Based upon a strict
reading of the statutes, Florida courts concluded that there must be
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in order for the defendant to
benefit from the remedies under either statute. 20' Incongruously,

199. See id.
200. See The FloridaBar, 550 So. 2d at 444 (providing that new rule 1.422 awards reasonable
costs and attorney's fees); FLA. STAT. § 45.061(3)(a) (1989) (allowing recovery of costs and
expenses including reasonable attorney's fees); FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1)(a) (1989) (awarding
reasonable costs and attorney's fees).
201. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes of the offer
of judgment provisions.
203. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 11 (explaining that even the best legislative
codes are rigid and bind the courts without exception, even in situations where the codes may
be inefficient or unjust); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure:A Study of Judicial
Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 643 (1957) (finding that since courts must clarify ambiguities in legislative rules in cases and controversies, lawsuits turn on questions of practice);
Pound, supra note 194, at 602 (stating that legislative rules have the disadvantage of being
made by one body and then being interpreted by another body).
204. Gunn v. DePaoli, 562 So. 2d 427, 427 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1990) (finding that a defendant
is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under § 768.79 unless a judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiff); Coe v. B & D Transp. Servs., Inc., 561 So. 2d 469, 470 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1990) (holding that judgment must be rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the
defendant to be entitled to fees and costs under §§ 768.79 or 45.061); Oriental Imports, Inc. v.
Alilin, 559 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1990) (stating that if the legislature had intended
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therefore, a plaintiff who unreasonably continues a lawsuit after an
offer of judgment and obtains a recovery less favorable than the offer
is sanctioned, while the same plaintiff escapes sanctions if the case is
lost completely." °s This interpretation fails to assist the offer of judgment rules in discouraging unmerited litigation.2
Unlike statutes, rules of court are interpreted by the same body
which promulgated them. Consequently, the court is aware of the
purpose underlying the rule and is able to interpret the rule consistent
with the rule's purpose.m Courts also are free to depart from the

for fees to be awarded under § 768.79 when a judgment is entered for a defendant, then the
legislature would have included the necessary language); Makar v. Investors Real Estate Mgmt.,
Inc., 553 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1989) (holding that the language of §§ 768.79 and
45.061 clearly requires a judgment for the plaintiff as a prerequisite to recovery of attorney's
fees and costs).
Furthermore, one Florida court also interpreted the previous version of rule 1.442 to require
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. B & H Constr. & Supply Co. v. District Bd. of Trustees
of Tallahassee Community College, Fla., 542 So. 2d 382, 888 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1989). However,
the B & H Constr. court based its interpretation of rule 1.442 on the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of rule 68 because rule 68 and the previous version of rule 1.442 were
identical. Id. (citing Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981)). Therefore, the Florida
courts must decide whether the same interpretation applies to the revised rule 1.442.
205. When the same result flowed from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of rule 68 in Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981), the Delta Court's decision was
criticized for requiring a judgment in favor of the plaintiff as a prerequisite to recovering attorney's fees and costs. See Note, Delta Air Lines v. August: Taking the Teeth Out of Rule 68, 43 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 765, 782 (1982) [hereinafter Taking the Teeth Out] (arguing that the Delta Court's
conclusion that rule 68 does not apply to losing plaintiffs is "fundamentally illogical"); Case Note,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 - When it Comes Down to Costs, It's Not How You Play
the Game, It's Whether You Win or Lose - Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 9 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 671, 680-81 (1981) [hereinafter Win or Lose] (concluding that the Supreme Court's interpretation of rule 68 is not well supported by "the plain meaning, purpose, and history of the rule");
Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Offers of Judgment - Prevailing Defendants
Are Not Within the Purview of Rule 68, 51 Miss. L.J. 599, 609 (1980-81) (stating that the logic
of the Delta Court's holding is "elusive").
206. See Taking the Teeth Out, supra note 205, at 784-85 (explaining that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of rule 68 reverses the normal functioning of rule 68 by preventing any
recovery when the plaintiff loses the judgment); Win or Lose, supra note 205, at 680-81 (determining that the Court's interpretation of rule 68 "restricts the scope of the rule and thus removes
an incentive for some defendants to make settlement offers").
207. See Dean, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judiciary'sPower to Promulgate
Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 139, 150-51 (1988) (asserting that the consistent
interpretation of rules by the body who created the rules is a virtue of judicial rulemaking);
Joiner & Miller, supra note 203, at 644 (arguing that the interpretation of rules by the same
group that promulgated the rules has resulted in an interpretation that relies less on
technicalities); Pound, Regulating ProceduralDetails by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. 12, 13
(1927) (stating that the interpretation of rules by those who make and apply the rules will result
in an interpretation that is consistent with the intent and purpose of the rules).
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literal wording of a rule in order to do justice and accomplish the
purpose of the rule.2°
Court interpretations of the previous version of rule 1.442 support
these generalizations. When faced with the issue of whether the acceptance of an offer of judgment which is silent as to attorney's fees
terminates the litigation and forecloses postjudgment recovery of statutory attorney's fees, the Florida Supreme Court answered affirmatively. 2° The court emphasized that the purpose of rule 1.442 is to
210
encourage settlement and terminate disputes.
Similarly, when confronted with the issue of whether post-offer of
judgment costs incurred by a nonparty on behalf of a named party
may be recovered under rule 1.442,211 the Florida Supreme Court
again looked to the purpose and policies underlying the offer of judgment rule and the statutes.2 12 The court ruled that the offeror could
recover costs incurred after making an offer of judgment pursuant to
rule 1.442, even though the offeror's insurance company advanced the
costs.

213

The court explained that a contrary ruling would subvert the purpose and intent of rule 1.442.214 The court expressly rejected the lower
court's reasoning which reached the opposite conclusion based upon a
literal reading of the rule.215 Therefore, in practice, as in theory, the
supreme court's familiarity with the purpose of the offer of judgment
rule and the court's ability to avoid strict adherence to the language
of the rule has resulted in decisions consistent with the purpose of
the rule.
When a legislatively created rule of procedure needs to be modified
or revised, change must await the next legislative session. 216 Moreover,

208. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010 (providing that the rules of civil procedure "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action").
209. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989).
210. Id. (holding that "[tihe clear intent of the underlying policy of the rule was to terminate
all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for further intervention of the judicial process").
211. Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1990).
212. Id. at 1083 (finding that the purpose of rule 1.442 and §§ 45.061 and 768.79 is 'to
encourage parties to settle claims without going to trial").
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (rejecting the reasoning that the language of the offer of judgment rule and statutes
indicates that costs must be incurred by a party, as stated by the district court of appeal in
Aspen v. Bayless, 552 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1989), quashed, 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990)).
216. See Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28,
45 (1952) (explaining that if the legislative rule does not work well, changes cannot be made
until the next meeting of the legislature); Joiner & Miller, supra note 203, at 643 (arguing

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/2

28

Wright: Confusion in Florida Offer of Judgement Practice: Resolving the C
FLORIDA OFFER OF JUDGMENT PRACTICE

legislatures, in general, demonstrate an unwillingness to make minor
217
changes in individual rules without embarking on wholesale reform.
This reform process often results in a more complicated legislative
scheme. 218 Nowhere have these concerns been borne out more clearly
than in the Florida offer of judgment area in which the legislature
219
has enacted two overlapping offer of judgment statutes.
In contrast, judicially-created procedural rules periodically are re-

examined and easily revised.220 The recent revision of rule 1.442221

confirms this advantage. In response to a petition by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar, the Florida Supreme Court
revised rule 1.442 based upon recommendations from the Rules Committee, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, and others. 2

Much needed revision was thereby accomplished quickly with minimal
political involvement. Furthermore, the court is free to make minor
adjustments to rule 1.442 in the future without resorting to complete
revision.
Commentators cite other advantages of judicial rulemaking. The
most important of these advantages include: a process which complies

with the public's expectation that the judiciary is responsible for the
efficient administration of justice;224 a process immune from political

against legislative regulation of practice and procedure because "legislative sessions occur only
at yearly intervals" and because 'needed revision is [often] passed over by the legislature when
no organized, effective voice is raised in its support").
217. See Pound, supra note 194, at 602 (stating that legislatures are so busy in most
jurisdictions that they have difficulty acting on matters concerning the rules of procedure).
218. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 203, at 643 (arguing that legislative rulemaldng often
creates "cumbersome, over particularized, and complicated machinery for the administration of
justice"); Pound, supra note 194, at 603 (determining that legislative rulemaking focuses on
details and "becomes elaborate and over-grown, and is of necessity rigid and unyielding").
219. See FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1989); id. § 768.79.
220. See Dean, supra note 207, at 150 (asserting that the courts are able to make minor
changes in individual rules of procedure without wholesale reform); Joiner & Miller, supra note
203, at 643 (stating that the courts can periodically reexamine 'the rules of procedure to eliminate
inequities in the rules"); Pound, supra note 194, at 602 (asserting that judicial regulation of
procedure by court rules assures "a simple effective procedure, attained by gradual and conservative overhauling and reshaping").
221. The FloridaBar, 550 So. 2d at 442-44.
222. Id. at 442.
223. See, e.g., id. at 442-44. Shortly after the Florida Supreme Court issued the original
opinion revising rule 1.442, the court issued a revised opinion, on motions for rehearing, making
a drafting change in the rule. Id.
224. See, e.g., Joiner & Miller, supra note 203, at 643 (arguing for judicial rulemaking
because "(tuhe courts are responsible for the proper and efficient administration of justice").
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pressures;m and a process which utilizes judicial expertise in procedural matters. 2 6 Therefore, unconstitutionality is not the sole justification for invalidation of the offer of judgment statutes. Jurisprudential
realities and public policy concerns also support invalidation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Florida Statutes sections 45.061 and 768.79 are intended to make
the judicial process more efficient for all litigants. These statutes allow
a court to sanction a party who refuses to accept a timely offer which
is more favorable than the ultimate recovery.2 27 Both statutes apply
to a broad cross section of civil actions without favoring a particular
class of litigants or cause of action.- In the separation of powers
context, therefore, proper analysis reveals that both statutes are procedural.- 9 As such, both statutes represent improper procedural legislative enactments.3 0
The Florida Supreme Court's reluctance to address the constitutionality of the offer of judgment statutes is understandable. The substance/procedure dichotomy is confounding.2 1 However, substantive
and procedural statutes must be distinguished in order to ensure that
the legislature occupies its proper place in the constitutional
framework. To allow an almost exclusively procedural statute to pass
constitutional muster merely because the statute creates a new right
or liability will encourage further legislative encroachment into the
procedural sphere.-2
The Florida Supreme Court can restore order and predictability
to Florida offer of judgment practice by expressly invalidating the
offer of judgment statutes. To date the supreme court has merely

225. See, e.g., Wigmore, All Legislative Rules ForJudiciaryProcedureAre Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 278 (1928) (stating that the judiciary is politically disinterested
and any bias which may exist "is counteracted by the professional opinion of the bar").
226. See Pound, supra note 194, at 602 (explaining that unlike the legislatures, the courts
have the experience to make procedural changes without having to call in experts to explain
the proposed change).
227. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
228.

See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.

229. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the supreme court's
exclusive power over matters of practice and procedure in state courts.
231. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty experienced by many courts in formulating definitions of substance and procedure.
232. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 37-38 (arguing that the judiciary must
faithfully exercise its constitutional rulemaking authority to the utmost to prevent slow encroachment by the legislature).
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65

declared that rule 1.442 supersedes sections 768.79 and 45.061 in their

procedural details. This holding fosters litigation,2 as illustrated by
the recent split among the district courts of appeal.m Only by expressly

invalidating the offer of judgment statutes may the supreme court
obtain for the State of Florida all the benefits inherent in a system
of exclusive judicial rulemaldng.2
Clinton A. Wright III

233. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the split among the
district courts of appeal concerning the constitutionality of § 45.061.
235. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 38 (determining that the main virtue of
exclusive judicial rulemaldng is 'its ready flexibility and immediate responsiveness to current
problems").
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